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Abstract:  
        The objective of this article is to study the direct and indirect effects of corruption 
control via the action of public power on economic development (economic growth, 
education, health, etc.). This work also seeks to show spending on areas of education and 
health to improve the skills and human capital levels of education. Finally, we try to test the 
complementarity between the role of the action of public power and control of corruption 
(anti-corruption) in a context of economic development while using the models of 
simultaneous equations for our area of MENA study, during a definite period (1984-2012).       
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Résumé : 
      L’objectif de cet article  est d’étudier les effets directs et indirects du contrôle de la 
corruption via l’action du pouvoir public sur le développement économique (croissance 
économique, éducation, santé, etc.). Ce travail cherche aussi de montrer les dépenses  allouées 
aux secteurs de l’éducation et de la santé pour améliorer les compétences et les niveaux de 
scolarisation du capital humain. Finalement, nous tentons de tester la complémentarité entre le 
rôle important de l’action du pouvoir public et le contrôle de la corruption (anti-corruption) 
dans un contexte du développement économique tout en utilisant les modèles à des équations 
simultanés pour notre région d’étude MENA, durant une période bien déterminée (1984-
2012).  
       Mots clés : Croissance économique, Contrôle de la corruption, Action du pouvoir public, 
capital humain,  et Modèles à des équations simultanés. 
      Classification JEL : C13, J24, K0, F24 et C33. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The abundance of empirical work provides a clear idea about international differences 
in annual per capita GDP accounted for by differences between the ways of governance and 
also between institutional quality.  Developing countries could improve their economic 
performance while appyant on the quality of their institutions, they-fixing rules on economic 
matters that are necessary for economic growth during the period of operation. So, good 
institutional quality complies with the law, resolve conflicts, protect property rights and 
maintain order. It guarantees a very efficient management of public goods, an efficient 
bureaucracy, significant public investments in education, health and infrastructure. Thus, « the 
problems of governance, transparency and accountability, public strongly handicapped the 
economic, social and human, by building barriers to investment and reducing the country's 
ability to optimize the use of its resources and to further improve the living conditions of 
citizens ». (Karim Ben Kahla, 2013) 
     As part of this work, we choose another more channel that also reflects a very clear 
path illuminating public corruption in some areas. Indeed, the general idea of this path is the 
following: "Governance is the institutional image of a country where corruption exists or not 
in the world into consideration." Furthermore, economic governance encompasses the central 
decisions of economic activities provided in a nation or country in a framework with the rest 
of the world. It inevitably has significant consequences on growth and institutional quality. 
We close our econometric study how the public power (government efficiency and the 
fight against corruption) promotes the development (in sectors of education and health). That 
Is the control of corruption promotes the development of basic sectors such as health care 
and education?  
In this context and according Ablo and Ritva (1998), corruption can reduce the impact 
of public spending on education and health on social performance (literacy or illiteracy rates, 
mortality rates or life expectancy) and weakens the quality of services provided.  Reducing 
this scourge would significantly improve in terms of child mortality and primary enrollment 
rates by Gupta et al. (2001). In addition, « corruption affects the share of expenditure in GDP 
allocated to different sectors of the economy negatively for health and education spending ». 
(Mauro, 1998) 
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Tiongson and Gupta (2003), in this area, treated the negative impact of corruption on 
human development while showing that corruption was detrimental to the health status and 
educational level of the population, but also it generated a loss of efficiency of health and 
education spending. This work will focus on the empirical side and will review the results, 
interpretations and discussions by comparison of the main empirical studies and previous 
studies while comparing the results for the MENA region. To do this, we will specify the 
models used and we will conduct the main tests of key assumptions for our estimate of 
simultaneous equations models. We will have to press a few education and health indicators. 
For the first great line (eduction), we use the ratio of educational expenses and those of 
research and development (% of GDP) to know the percentage of this expenditure in the total 
consumption of the country and also to know well the illiteracy rate (ignorance) in some 
world regions. Regarding the latter sector (health) will set the study of corruption in the health 
sector while focusing on purely health indicators such as rates of public health expenditure (% 
of GDP) and the child mortality rate as we will have an idea on Are the capacity of health 
spending can reduce the mortality rate in these countries. 
       In addition, the relative question of public spending and corruption is already treated by 
Gupta and Tiongson (2002) treated it generated a loss of efficiency of health and education 
spending. But, querying control there will be corruption effective in the fight against 
corruption? Is it-that the sustainability of public spending in basic social sectors (education 
and health) by political decisions (action of public power) remains adequate to the 
development of countries? 
        The majority of the worlds third countries or developing countries and to sustainable and 
lasting development, we choose to explain the growth rate, control of corruption and human 
capital, as variables of both endogenous and exogenous. These indicators are explained by 
other structural and institutional indicators. The answer to the central question involves the 
following additional questions:  
                -To fight against corruption (corruption beyond control), public spending on  
education and research -they are able to innovation in research and reduce ignorance in our 
sample (MENA and OECD)? 
- The government effectiveness in the fight against corruption remains the only  
element necessary for public health spending should be accompanied by a low mortality rate 
and an improvement in the quality of services for the same areas of study and during a 
definite period (1984-2012)?                                  
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2. Revue de la littérature 
2.1.  Education and health institutional determinants of corruption: action of 
public power 
     The many works of the first offer several possible prospects of deepening the analysis of 
the implications of the institutional context on the level of public funding. Thus, the 
relationship between public spending and economic growth has been studied in many 
empirical studies. 
        The contributions of Tanzi and Schuknecht in 2003 showed that "public finances do not 
carry long-term growth. This can be explained partly by the existence of crowding out of 
private investment by public investment, and secondly by poor mobilization and inefficient 
allocation of public revenue. " 
       Indeed, some recent work Schuknecht Afonso, Ebert and Thone (2005) showed 
that "if public spending is good, then the products services following expenditures are 
efficient and can generate economic growth." The notion of public spending and its 
performance in the economies has been analyzed by several authors (Easterly and Levine, 
2003) as a way of governance, which have sought to construct an empirical measure of the 
performance of public spending in the field of provision of services education, health and 
legal regulations. 
         In this context, "governance is supposed to have a positive impact on the level of 
income." (Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Easterly and 
Levine (2003) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002)). It also has a positive impact on 
the growth rate of the economy. (Knack and Keefer (1995), Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001), Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson (2004) and Weede (2006)). So in this 
case we speak of good governance. 
Gaudin (2002) states that "governance refers more to the change in the relationship 
between politics and economics," while for Hamel and Jouve (2006), governance refers more 
to the questioning of the governability of companies traditional democratic western directed 
by one central decision-making authority. There are some other authors as Meiseil and Ould 
Aoudia, (2007) show that "governance has no impact on growth, but only on the level of 
income, or even a negative impact." So this is bad governance. 
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  The divergence of ideas in a governance context, we drive to talk about another 
institutional support since good governance offers a good institutional quality and contrast. 
Many like Kaufmann et al. (2005) developed an interesting approach to measure the quality of 
political institutions (governance). 
 Kaufmann, D. and M. Mastruzzi (2005) define governance "as the traditions and institutions 
that enable the exercise of authority in a country. It includes how governments are 
established, monitored and replaced; the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the condition of the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them. The indicators measure six broad 
areas of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and finally the control of 
corruption’’. 
According to these authors North (1990, 1995), Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2004), Clague, Keeferet and Olson (1995), Alesina and Perotti (1996), effective institutions 
can contribute to improved economic performance and success of reforms. Some other 
neoliberal authors like Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004), Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi (2002) argue that "the quality of institutions is vital not only for the revival of growth, 
but mostly for development. It is the only factor determining the level of development ". It 
appears that good governance, as there are in OECD countries, is based mainly on control of 
corruption within the government to show the effectiveness of public power. 
However, the most debilitating institutional factors in the quality of governance vary 
by region. It appears that, for the MENA region, the quality of the judicial system and 
bureaucratic quality are the most debilitating factors in the quality of governance in the 
region. 
Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson (2000) showed that "the effect of corruption on the 
provision of public education after the regression of various indicators of academic progress 
(failure rate in primary school, rates of illiterate, can be accepted as evidence of quality 
public education services on a constant and the corruption index’’.  
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2.2.   Effectiveness of the action of the public power 
 
  It reflects "the perception of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of the 
formulation and implementation of policies and the credibility of the commitment these 
government policies". (Kaufmann et al. 2003) 
     It is a measure of the competence of the public bureaucracy and quality of public 
services. This variable is mainly explained by the following: 
- The quality of public policy. 
- The quality of government staff. 
- The twists can affect the quality of government staff. 
- The ability of the government to develop new programs. 
- The probability that when a government agent violated the rules, another agent can 
go to another agent (or above) and obtain correction of the irregular act. 
- The extent of the length of time spent by economic agents with bureaucrats; either 
bureaucratic delays. 
- The quality of services provided by the state. 
- Predictability of changes in the rules and laws. 
- The transparency of decentralization. 
- The competence of the staff in the public sector in relation to staff skills belonging u 
private sector. 
- The waste in government spending. 
- The level of exposure of the public services to political interference. 
Finally, this trend mesuer "Government Effectiveness" is insufficient to give the exact 
institutional indicator. 
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3.  Choice of variables and Estimation Methodology 
     
3.1. The action of the public power and the triangle "Growth, Control of 
Corruption and Human Capital": A Simultaneous Equations Model 
 
       Our goal is to study the direct and indirect effects of control of corruption through 
the action of public power on economic development (economic growth, education, health, 
etc.). and also to show the importance of spending on areas of education and health to 
improve the skills and human capital levels of education. We will adopt the estimate by the 
simultaneous equation models that meet, mathematically speaking, the following three 
equations: 
*The Growth Equation:       =   +              ∑   
 
                
*The Control of Corruption Equation:       =                 ∑   
 
               
*The Humain Capital:                        ∑   
 
              
In order not to complicate things and simplified, these equations become like this: 
                                                                      (A’)    
                                                                                  (B’) 
                                                                          
   
(i = 1 . . . 17; N = 493;  t = 1. . . 29 ) 
Avec ; 
      =        
    =      
    =       
    =                   , with        is  the vecteur P     ,      ,                  
    =        
    =               
       ,      et     are respectively the random variables of the equations A, B et C. 
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 * Development of equations (A), (B ') and (C') for the MENA region 
         First, we start with the first equation of the model; This is the equation of economic growth 
which will be explained by the human indicator and the control of corruption indicator via the action 
of public power 'was justified by the public intervention in economic activities. For MENA, we adopt 
macroeconomic indicators and existing values in the World Bank website. Then equation (A ') is 
written as follows: 
                                                        
Avec ;       is an indicator that includes the variables as (Inv.), (FDI), (POP) et (GC) 
The equation becomes while taking into account the ratings assigned to the MENA region as 
the human flag (HK) and the opening indicator (TRAD). 
                                                                        
       Then we will develop the second corruption check equation (B ') that explains this better noted 
indicator (CC) with the indicator of economic growth (GDP) and the indicator (HK) and we added a 
variable of effectiveness of government (GE). 
                                         
The third human capital equation (C') will be developed to explain the human flag 
(HK) by the indicator of economic growth and corruption control flag (CC) while taking into 
account the variables of education (ED) and health (HE) .For education be explained by three 
variables such as public spending as a percentage of GDP to education (PSE) and research 
and development (RD) and ignorance rates (IR), while health is explained by two indicators 
namely public spending as a percentage of GDP in health (PSH) and mortality rates (MR). 
                                                
       This equation (C ') becomes as follows: 
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3.2. Preliminary  tests 
         The tests mandatory assumptions for estimating simultaneous equations models, a series 
of conventional econometric tests will be directed to the composition of equations and 
variables of the estimated model. First, there is stationarity tests, collinear. Thereafter, we turn 
to the presentation of the main findings, interpretations and debates compared to previous 
studies.                  
                       * Stationary tests 
We know in advance that to check the stationary panel data, we can have recourse to the first 
generation of stationary tests. These Types of tests involving 1èregénération panel data are the 
tests Levin and Lin (1992); Pesaran (1997); and K. Hadri (2000). That said, it should be noted 
that for the tests of the first generation, they are only applicable on cylindered panels, that is 
to say without missing data that is the case of our variables.  Thus using the test Pesaran 
(1997), we find that all variables are stationary in levels. 
            * Study collinearity between independent variables 
     Before tackling the empirical analysis underlying our goal, it should be noted that 
the use of simultaneous equations models is exposed to two possible problems, those of 
endogenous
3
 explanatory variables and collinearity between variables independent. 
    The first difficulty can lead to biased estimates. To solve this problem, it must pass 
through instrumental variables. So, practically, it is not easy to find instruments, it is 
not easy to have data on these instruments. We assume, in this work, that the bias due 
to this problem is zero. 
     The second problem arises when there is a strong correlation between the 
explanatory variables. A strong correlation leads to poor estimates of the coefficients 
for the determinant of the matrix (XX') is almost zero; with (X): the matrix of 
explanatory variables. To solve this problem, it is necessary that the invertible matrix. 
 
 
                                                          
3
 A variable is said to explain or endogenous in an econometric equation, when it is not independent of error 
terms, which may cause a bias in the estimates of the coefficients     
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3.3. Multicollinearity problem and model selection 
 
                        * Principle 
The explanatory variables are highly correlated with the dependent variable. They must be 
weakly correlated. 
                   * Effects of multicollinearity: 
Among the existing consequences in this context, it is the increase of the estimated variance 
of certain coefficients and also the instability of estimators of the coefficients of least squares. 
So in case of perfect multicollinearity the matrix (X'X) is singular, the estimated coefficients 
is impossible. 
                      * Test Klein:  
It is not a statistical test in terms of a hypothesis test, but simply a multicollinearity 
presumptive criterion. There appearance multicollinearity if the coefficient of determination 
of the full model (R
2
) is lower than the correlation coefficients (r
2
 xi, xj) and we need to 
compare the R correlation coefficients (RXI, xj) that appear in the coefficient matrix 
correlation. 
                    * Test Farrar and Glauber 
Insofar as the empirical value of χ2 is greater than the value read from the table, there is 
assumption of multicollinearity. 
                    * Correct multicollinearity: 
     When specifying the model, we eliminate the explanatory series could be correlated and 
represent the same phenomena and increase the sample size if the added observations differ 
from the first.  To correct the regression channel: this is a purely numerical response of 
transforming X'X in (X'X + αI) where α is an arbitrarily chosen constant. We increase and 
the first diagonal and "digital" effects of multicollinearity are reduced. 
                   * Other methods 
     The first method is the stepwise regression procedure identical to the previous, except that 
after the incorporation of a new explanatory variable, the Student t of each of the previously 
selected variables are examined and variables with t Student is below the threshold are 
eliminated.  
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3.4.   Identification problem of the model equations 
         The model identification requirements are determined by equation equation. Three 
situations may arise. 
 The sub-model is identified, if a model equation is sub-identifiable (that is to say that 
there are fewer equations than to identify parameters in the structural form). In such a 
situation, the system is impossible to solve. 
 When all the equations are "just" identifiable, the model would be "just" found. 
 The model is over-identified if the model equations are either "fair" or on-identifiable 
identifiable.   When the model is under-identified, it is impossible to estimate its 
parameters and modeling must be re-specified. The model identification requirements 
are the subject of a sometimes complex development. 
       In the following, we will limit our analysis to the study of simple rules that are, in 
practice, applied first. The most applied identification requirements are the conditions of order 
and rank conditions. However, to make these identifications, it is essential to check whether 
there are any restrictions to be considered in this study or not. There is a restriction on a 
coefficient of the structural shape, each time a parameter is constrained to be equal to a 
determined value. There are two types of restrictions that can be identified, namely the 
exclusion restrictions and linear restrictions.                    
                  * Exclusion Restrictions 
        This restriction is to assign a zero coefficient for each endogenous or exogenous variable 
that does not appear in a structural equation. In our model, the variable "GE" is in the first 
equation and, respectively, at the second and third equation. Likewise, the variables "POP", 
"IN", "TRAD", "GC" and "FDI" are at the first equation and do not appear at the second 
or the third equation. There are variables which occur at the second and the third equation and 
is not available at the first. This amounts to affect all these variables zero coefficients in 
equations in which they are not included. 
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                     * Linear Restrictions 
         Some specifications require that the model variables are assigned an identical 
coefficient. This type of restriction is not present in our model. Once the restrictions on the 
coefficients performed, it is essential to carry out the identification of the system of equations. 
There are two conditions identifications: order conditions (necessary conditions) and rank 
conditions (sufficient conditions).                     
                 * The necessary conditions: Order Conditions 
     After selecting the variables to include in the model a step prior to the treatment step of 
simultaneous equation models is to perform model identification tests to select the most 
appropriate estimation method.  In our case, we find for the model to study, all equations are 
over-identified. Indeed, we have three endogenous variables in the model (whether W= 3) 
"GDP", "CC" and "HK" and exogenous variables eleven "TRAD", "IN", "FDI", "GC", 
"POP "," GE "," PSE"," RD " , " PSH "," MR "and" IR "(whether, K = 11) 
      The first equation has seven exclusion restrictions and no restriction constraint
4
.  
          By applying the requirements for identification, the variables in the equation of poverty 
give: W '= 1, K = 6 and r = 0 with W' is the number of endogenous variables in an equation 
and K 'is the number of exogenous variables in an equation. Is therefore: W - W '+ K - K' = 
3-1 + 11-6 =  7> W - 1 = 3-1 = 2, the first equation is identified-on
5
. 
      The second equation has seven exclusion restrictions but no constraint restrictions. We 
consequently W = 3, K = 11, W = 1, K = 3 and r = 0, which gives us: W - W '+ K - K' = 3-1 
+ 11-3 = 10> W - 1 = 2, the equation is over-identified.  The third equation has six exclusion 
restrictions but no constraint restrictions. We therefore   W = 3, K = 11, W = 1, K = 8 and r 
= 0,   Which implies W-W '+ K- K' = 3 - 1 + 11-8 = 4> W - 1 = 2, the third equation is on-
identified. Since in our model all equations are over-identified, the model will be on-
identified.                 
                                                          
4 When the model contains linear restrictions, we must add the numbers in the second part of equality that is to 
say we need to compare W - 1 and W - W '+ K - K' + r. 
5
 For more details on order conditions see the work of Bourbonnais (2002). 
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               * Sufficient conditions: rank conditions 
          If the order of conditions are satisfied, it is also important to check the rank conditions 
(sufficient conditions). However, in practice, they reveal is difficult or sometimes impossible, 
to implement. This is what drives us to limit our analysis to the level of verification of 
qualified order conditions necessary conditions. 
            * Method SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) 
         In our case, the presented model is over-identified. The adopted method was the 
econometric method SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression). This method is suitable for 
treating this kind of model. 
           However, our model is characterized by the presence of an endogeneity problem of 
order two, by its definition, which is why the estimate by the least squares method would 
triple longer recommended. 
      The estimation method is based on the principle of applying the ordinary least squares 
method in three stages. A technique to solve endogeneity problems is to introduce the origin 
of these problems variables as instrumental variables. However, the version used in this study 
is that of STATA 11. Using the method 2 SLS, treatment with Stata software allows us to 
complete resolution of the results to criticize. 
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4. The variables used in the estimation 
                Table N°1: Summary measures of the variables used in this estimate. 
 
Source: Work done by the author 
            
   
  
 
 
           
Variables Formulas Measure adopted and Data Source 
Economic Gowth GDP The annual growth rate of GDP per capita.(WDI) 
Humain Capital HK    Tertiary  enrollment rate.(WDI) 
Domestic Investment IN The gross fixed capital formation to GDP. ( WDI) 
Demographic Variable POP The population Growth rate .(WDI) 
Foreign Drect Investment FDI Net flows of foreign direct investment.(WDI) 
Tade  Openness TRAD The sum of exports and imports to GDP.(WDI) 
Government  Consumption. GC The level of government consumption as a percentage of GDP.(WDI) 
Quality of public services GE The effectiveness of government.(WGI) 
Education        PSE Public spending as a percentage of GDP to Education .(WDI) 
 
RD Public spending on research and development as a percentage of 
GDP.(WDI) 
 
IR Inorance rates. (WDI) 
 
Health PSH Public spending as a percentage of GDP in Health.(WDI) 
MR Mortality rates. (WDI) 
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5. Analysis of model results 
5.1.Economic growth, control of corruption, Human Capital and Development:   
                       Simple Model  
 
 
 (1) 
 
 
                    (4) (5)                                        (2) 
               
 (8) 
       
(3)                         (6)           (7)          
                           
 
                             (9)           (10)          (13) 
 
 (11) 
                                                    (12) 
                                     
 
 
 (14) 
      (15) 
 
                     (16) 
 
 
   Schema: A simple model for the system of economic development 6 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 The diagram made by the author.  
Economic 
Growth Economic Development 
Human 
Capital  
Action of the 
public power 
ction du 
Public expenditure 
on sectors of 
education and health 
 Control of 
Corruption 
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5.2. Effects of the action of public power on growth, on  the control of corruption and 
on  human capital 
 
Table N°2: Analysis of the results of the regression model on the effects of public power on 
growth, on the control of corruption andon  human capital. 
 
Note: The terms in parentheses are t-Student and *, **, ***: significant at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively.        
 
 
Variables    Economic Growth         Control of Corruption           Humain Capital 
constant                     4.192684                                            0.0613157 11.669854 
                      (1.78)*                                                  (0.32)* (21.41)*** 
GE                    0.6239878                                          0.6470029 -0.2208426 
                      ( 1.22)                                                  (9.93)***                                (-13.89)*** 
 GDP                     --------                                                 0. 0120123 
                                                                                    ( 1.68)* 
                                -0.0028065 
(-1.81)* 
HK                    -0.7631697                                          0.3809584 
                    (  -0.72)                                                (  2.46)* 
-------- 
 
POP                    0.840811                                               -------- -------- 
                      (0.65)  
FDI                   0.1555243                                              --------- ------- 
                    ( 1.69)*  
GC                     1.454449                                              --------- ------- 
                    (0.45)  
Inv                   0.035726                                              ---------     ------- 
                     ( 0.52  
TRAD                  -0. 2994704                                             ---------            -------- 
                    (-0.78)  
PSE       
                                                           
                ---------                                     --------- 
 
 
             -0.0125085 
                                          (-2.77)** 
RD                    --------                                             ---------                 0 .2582324 
                      (15.99)*** 
IR                     ---------                                                     -----------                  -3.20e-10 
                  (-0.761) 
PSH 
                    ----------                                                -----------                  0.5167472 
                   (8.23)*** 
MR                        ----------                                               ---------                     -0.7454766 
                        (-18.81)*** 
Observations                       493                                                             493                493 
R
2
                        0.0169                                                  0.1648                  0.4855 
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         * Effects of public power on control of corruption, on economic growth and on human capital 
     We recall that the purpose of our study is to test the impact of the control of 
corruption on development through the action of public power. 
   In this case, the human factor as an endogenous element that we need to explain 
plays a key role in explaining the nature of relationship between economic development 
(application to areas of eduction and health) and the fight against corruption via action of 
public power. Our study tries to know the capacity to fight against corruption by applying a 
control strategy. We then analyze the effects of the action of public power on the variables to 
explain as corruption control (CC) on human capital (HK) and on economic growth (GDP).  
            * The direct effect of public power in the control of corruption 
     The results show that there is a positive and significant relationship (1%) and a 
positive direct effect (0.6470029) between the annual growth rate of GDP per capita and the 
action of public power for the MENA region during the period definite (1984-2012). 
Indeed, these results show the power and state power to provide programs for the fight 
against corruption in our first study region (MENA). In this case, the institutional indicator 
(control of corruption) plays a very important role in the fight against corruption. This 
positive relationship that combines the action of the public power with the control of 
corruption is collaborated in Farida et al studies. (2008); Tanzi and Davoodi (1997). 
According to these authors, "corruption in general, can hit especially the political sphere 
where there is the" big "corruption leading to distortions in the allocation of development 
projects related resources. These distortions are all the greater as the level of the control 
institutions is low. " It is the complementarity between the action of the public power and 
control of corruption. 
               * The direct effect of public power on economic growth 
According to the table N°2, the relationship between the effectiveness of the action of 
public power and growth is positive but not significant so the control of corruption through 
the action remains sterile in the region MENA. That is to say, the action of public power is 
ineffective in the fight against corruption as it hinders growth and also the development. In 
this context, according to Mauro (2005), any improvement in the fight against corruption will 
have a positive effect on economic growth. This idea is also supported with the work of 
Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). That is why the fight against corruption through the 
effective action of public power can block some parts reproduction of corruption in attracting 
foreign investors. Moreover, the action of the public power has a positive indirect effect on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and significant (10%).  
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This positive impact between controlling corruption and foreign direct investment 
encourages investors to boost production and improve economic growth because corruption 
can hit this essential component (FDI) in economic growth. (Mauro, P. 2005).  
According Pellegrin and Gerlach (2004) specifies: "five transmission channels through 
which corruption affects growth, the most important of which are investment respectively, 
FDI and trade." In another study developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), corruption 
systems that are more predictable have a negative impact on lower foreign direct investment 
that systems are less predictable. According to Wei (1997): "the effect of uncertainty of 
corruption on foreign direct investment is negative and statistically significant. In addition, 
control of corruption through public intervention a positive impact on the majority of other 
economic indicators such as structural indicators ". 
     In total, Ali and Houdan (2003) argue that a good knowledge of the determinants of 
corruption can help the authorities to put in place measures to weaken its harmful effect on 
investment and also on growth. Then, according to Bardhan Purana (1996): "the possibility 
for the state to control corruption depends on its vis-à-vis credibility of its people and the 
establishment of credible institutions and strong."  
       We are talking about good governance with an efficiency of power and government 
power that enables us to provide a better institutional quality fighting against corruption while 
directing human capital in the correct pattern of growth for this area of study. 
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    * The effect of corruption control through the action of public power on human capital 
           To test the effects of corruption control (CC) through public action and decisive 
decisions on human capital depending on the expenditure allocated to develop the basic social 
sectors, we have adopted the models of simultaneous equations that can be comparable with 
the work of  Seka (2013) all by using an indicator of control of corruption rather than 
corruption perception index to test the corruption control input relation and development to 
which we added a third equation on our contribution in the model of simultaneous equations 
of human capital and we also adopt the same approach as that of Ouattara (2007). 
        The results of the panel data estimates we made describing the effect of the action of 
public authority on human capital is negative and significant (1%) during the period 1984 to 
2010 for the MENA region. And as a result of the action of the public power in the control of 
corruption is positive and significant (1%) so the control of corruption has a negative effect 
on human capital. According Seka (2013): "the estimate shows a negative and highly 
significant link between the action of the public power and the enrollment rate for higher 
education." 
       * The indirect impacts of the action of public power on spending for education and health 
   According to (2013), several channels exist through which corruption affects human capital, 
but for our work these channels will be between control of corruption on human capital). And 
to distinguish between grand corruption and petty corruption, we must mention some channels 
that we choose to develop the rest of this study, namely the allocation of resources (public 
expenditure on education and health) and training quality (quality of service).  The estimation 
results of the last regression of human capital detect the following: 
 Public spending on education are statically significant (1%) and they Have a negative 
effect on human capital. These results confirm the work of Kim and Moody (1992) and 
Musgrove (1996) which states that "public spending in basic social sectors are not 
effectively allocated and do not allow then to promote economic growth in developing 
countries. " 
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          According to Mauro (1997): "Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP 
are highly negatively correlated with corruption (corruption is high more less is spent on 
education" Similarly, control of corruption is one. clear effect on expenditures for research 
and development. This effect is positive and significant (10%). 
           Besides, Davoodi and Gupta (2000) show that "in the same context, that the most 
corrupt countries spend less on education." The authors show that "a high level of corruption 
can increase income inequality and poverty reduction through economic growth and weak 
human capital formation." 
 Public expenditure on health are statically significant (1%) and have a positive impact 
on human capital (HK). This idea is confirmed with the recent work of Afonso, Ebert, 
and Schuknecht Thone (2005) mounted that "when public spending is good, then the 
products services following its expenditures are efficient and can generate economic 
growth ". 
       Because of the control of corruption, there is a reduction of corruption "that would make 
significant improvements in infant mortality" (Gupta et al, 2001). In contrast, in our study the 
mortality rate is negatively significant (1%). Davoodi and Gupta Tiongson (2000) show that 
"the reduction of corruption can result in significant social gains measured by a reduction in 
child mortality, a small percentage of babies deaths and a low rate of school dropouts" . 
        In total, according Delavallade (2006): "corruption increases public spending share of 
order and services, energy, and culture in relation to expenditure on education and health." 
Corruption weakens the impact of public spending on education and health on social 
performance (literacy rates, mortality rates, etc ...) and decreases the quality of services 
provided (Ablo and Reinikka, 1998).  
       Thus, corruption may corrupt the contribution of public services, reduce the amount of 
services and neutralize the quality of state projects. So is the case of the member countries of 
the MENA region.        
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5.3. Effects of human capital on economic growth and on  control of corruption                                                           
* The direct effect of human capital on growth 
According to the results table N°2, the link between human capital and economic 
growth appears not significant and the human indicator has a negative effect on growth. This 
result does not corroborate with the work of Barro (1991). 
In the model Rajhi (1996), "human capital generates externalities in the productive 
sector, on the one hand and in the education sector, on the other. The central hypothesis of 
this model is that educational technology of the individual agent is different from the social 
planner that is linear. " So, in the model of Lucas (1988), "human capital is a key growth 
while recalling that this model describes a macroeconomic approach of human capital like 
the endogenous growth models". Lucas "shows that there are two sources of human capital 
accumulation: education and learning by doing (the effects of learning by doing). The 
analysis of the author follows that of Becker for which growth is mainly determined by 
human capital. " 
We are talking of skills and expertise that have effects on the quality of services given 
by this factor as management of public spending that can generate and increase domestic 
production and develop some basic sectors. In addition, the results confirm the found work 
Ramon et al. (1998), "which analyzed the links between education and economic growth, or 
there is a negative impact on per capita income in most countries; and that economic 
policies that suppress market forces tend to reduce the impact of human capital on growth. 
They conclude that the investment in human capital can only have a small effect on growth 
unless education is acquired and used in open and competitive markets. " But Nguyen and 
Schwab (1999) note that "a positive and non-significant effect of human capital on 
increasing production." They justify this relationship "not significant by the superiority of 
the result of learning by doing, which was not taken into account."  
The impact generated by this work clarifies the non-significance of this relationship, 
this ambiguity shows insufficient public spending on education and research and 
development despite its positive effect on human capital but not significant and also what the 
result follows existence of ignorance in this area (MENA). 
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5.4. Effects of growth on the control of corruption and human capital  
       * The effect of growth on control of corruption 
   We note the existence of a positive significant relationship to (1%). So this study 
causality between indicators (indicator of growth and institutional indicator) is a source of 
several research works that highlight the passers effects of other variables such as investment 
(Mauro, 1995) and FDI (Habib and Zurawicki; 2002) and (Larrain and Tavares, 2004). By 
cons, Gyimah- Brempong (2002) shows that "the claim that corruption directly reduces the 
level of economic growth and indirectly deteriorates the quality of public and private 
investment in Africa." In this context, corruption is often associated with poor quality of 
institutions and functioning of the public sector (Salinas and Salinas -Jiménez -Jiménez, 
2007). 
In total, the growth rate improves when there is a control of corruption, which remains 
bound by a good government efficiency (The existence of the action of public power). This 
idea is developed by Welsch (2004) who finds that "any reduction of corruption led to an 
acceleration of economic growth." 
        * The effect of growth on human capital 
                The effect on human capital is significant to negatively (10%). According to Cohen and 
Soto(2001) provide that "this difference will decrease only by 2010". If human capital is an 
engine of economic growth as the fireplace Lucas (1988) and of technological catch as 
underlined Nelson & Phelps (1966), we can deduce that the use of a very effective human 
capital factor can improve economic growth.  
                  So this is not the case for the MENA region, there has dimunation presence of the action 
of public power which translate a Rating Decrease of annual GDP per capita and the absence 
of the development of economic activities. 
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* The direct effects of education spending and health human capital 
  For diagnosis of the relationship between education spending and human capital and 
from the table N°2, there is a negative and significant impact (10%) and is explained by the 
failure on the part expenditure for education in general. But spending on research and 
development have a significant positive effect (10%) to human capital which shows the 
importance of this share while improving the quality of education and reducing the rate of 
ignorance in this area ( MENA). 
For health spending on human capital, we note that the effect is positive and 
significant 1% and this conforms with the report of the Committee of the World Health 
Organization, in the general context of a symposium entitled: Macroeconomics and Health, 
led by SACHS (2001) which shows that "the growth of income per head is much stronger 
than wealth by beginning of period head is low and the infant mortality rate the also. "  
The explanation takes on a political dimension that remains close to this type of social 
sector. Then the development of the sector through some structural reforms accompanied by 
an increase in expenses (purchase of new equipment technologically) that serves to improve 
the quality of services the hospital to decrease the mortality rate. The latter has a negative 
significant (1%) to human capital. 
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6. Conclusion 
The income generated by this work has not clarified the significance of this 
relationship between human capital and economic growth, this ambiguity has shown the 
inadequacy of public spending on education, research and development despite its positive 
effect on capital human, but not significant. This result stemmed from the existence of 
ignorance in this area (MENA). 
However, the link between the fight against corruption and economic development 
from education and health through human capital. We adopted the estimated model that is 
identical to that used by Seka (2013) to test the relationship between corruption and 
development, to which we added a third equation for human capital and we have also adopted 
the same approach Ouattara (2007).  
Moreover, government corruption was explained by the handling of political decisions 
(in preparation of the state budget) while the corrupt behavior that was presented during the 
execution of the budget reflected a public corruption. This scourge has affected the allocation 
of public resources because it diverts the objectives of public resources. Thus, bureaucratic 
corruption has affected the redistribution of these resources (the way in which to manage the 
state budget). The weakness of public institutions and market restrictions generate the 
problem of corruption, which in turn acted on the different institutions of the economy. 
Moreover, human capital is the set of knowledge and know-how of a country, its 
relationship to growth presqu’évident. But, misallocation of resources and mismanagement in 
public spending fall several effects on human capital and also on the health and educational 
development of the economies of nations. 
   To do this, we studied the weight of public power and its power efficiency within the 
MENA region to implement reforms in the fight against corruption by a governance indicator. 
Following our empirical test, we proved the effect of the control of corruption on economic 
growth as conceived by the economic literature; We tried to empirically verify the direct and 
indirect effects between controlling corruption and human capital factor. 
In total, we have proven the effect of control of corruption on economic growth as 
conceived by the economic literature, and we tried to empirically verify the nature of the 
relationship between the control of corruption and the factor of human capital to distinguish 
among the different types of corruption.  
We have shown in detail the importance of state intervention to reduce the 
phenomenon of corruption in the management of resources (total public expenditure and 
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public spending on education and health) countries since corruption as a scourge to both 
social and economic, may hinder the development of basic social sectors such as education 
and health. We found that the control of corruption in the public sector (public expenditure) 
was performed negatively significant with educational expenses. These results confirm the 
work of Kim and Moody (1992) and Musgrove (1996), which showed that in developing 
countries public spending in these sectors are not so efficiently allocated and do not allow the 
promotion of economic growth. According to Mauro (1997), public expenditure on education 
as a percentage of GDP are highly negatively correlated with corruption (corruption is high 
more less is spent on education). And because of control of corruption, expenditure on public 
health was positively influenced significantly, there is a reduction of corruption "that would 
make significant improvements in child mortality." (Gupta et al; 2001). Moreover, since 
theoretically, corruption can deteriorate the quality of services offered and managed by 
governments and to analyze this problem in public spending, we distinguished between 
political corruption and administrative corruption. In this sense, Delavallade (2006) states that 
corruption increases the share expenses of order and public services, energy, and culture in 
relation to health and education spending. 
      Nevertheless, government efficiency is an indicator of governance (Kaufmann, 
2003), the coefficient of this indicator is positive and has a significant direct effect (1%) on 
the control of corruption in both zones into consideration. These results reflect the weight of 
the action of government and governance in the way the majority of payas of two regions, the 
reliability of these results also indicates the suitability of anti-corruption programs (fight 
against corruption). 
      The impact necessarily has indirect effects on the human factor, on improving 
growth following an increase in administrative production and a marked improvement in the 
quality of services and the development of basic sectors such as industry education and health 
sector. So the fight against corruption requires political will, a commitment of public power 
and also citizens because corruption can occur to increase the cost of services of education 
and public health. » It will reduce the amount of the provision of public services and it will 
decrease the quality of services of public health and education. Moreover, an increase in 
public spending on education and health leads to an increase of public resources, and a 
reduction in infant mortality rates ». (Gbewopo Attila, Chambas Gerard and Jean-Louis 
Combes, 2006).  
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      Appendixes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nomber MENA region 
 
 
                 1 Algeria 
2 Bahrain 
3 Egypt, Arab Rep. 
4 Iran, Islamic Rep. 
5 Iraq 
6 Israel 
7 Kuwait 
8 Lebanon 
9 Libya 
10 Oman 
11 Qatar 
12 Saudi Arabia 
13 Syrian Arab Republic 
14 Tunisia 
15 Turkey 
16 United Arab Emirates 
17 Yemen, Rep. 
  31 
 
*Descriptive statistics for the model developed for the MENA region 
 sum hk cc  gdp  inv  pop trad fdi ir rd  pse gc  psh mr  ge 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         hk |       493    1.183021    .3073372  -1.100672   1.783071 
          cc |       493   -.2609519    1.133996  -14.57475   2.602149 
       gdp |       493    4.682586    6.523964  -42.45112       46.5 
         inv |       493    1.456008     5.00497   .0002134   26.61561 
         pop |       493    2.914263    2.503662   -2.96236   17.48324 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        trad |       493   -.3006174    1.181017  -4.670521   1.763391 
         fdi |       493    2.023846    3.407211  -5.288191   33.56602 
          ir |       493     1057673    2.35e+07    .042871   5.21e+08 
          rd |       493    .2015047    .2483775    .000029    1.10218 
         pse |       493    3.204447    2.234166     .00011   12.02893 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          gc|       493    .5446687    .1324617   .1666667   .8733797 
        psh |       493    .6025059    .1607512    .049789   1.058963 
        mr |       493    1.384479    .2818594   .7993405   2.042181 
         ge |       493   -.1623128    .7350647  -1.947088    1.91651 
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*Correlation matrix for MENA 
cor hk cc gdp  inv  pop trad fdi  ir rd  pse gc psh mr  eg (obs=493) 
             |    hk      cc     gdp    inv      pop      trad      fdi  ir    rd      pse    gc    psh     mr  ge 
       hk |   1.0000 
          cc |  -0.0515   1.0000 
      gdp |  -0.0341   0.1050   1.0000 
         inv |   0.1274   0.0054   0.0014   1.0000 
         pop |  -0.2527   0.2254   0.0720  -0.1325   1.0000 
        trad |   0.1199   0.2690   0.0122   0.4123  -0.0019   1.0000 
         fdi |   0.2523   0.0683   0.0783  -0.0746   0.0938   0.1175   1.0000 
          ir |  -0.0706   0.0100   0.0074  -0.0099  -0.0170   0.0072  -0.0086 1.0000 
          rd |   0.0369   0.0757  -0.0860   0.3101  -0.1450   0.2321  -0.1313  0.0285   1.0000 
       pse |  -0.0858  -0.0917  -0.0897   0.3268  -0.0119  -0.0054   0.0451  0.0539   0.1235   1.0000 
          gc |  -0.0377   0.3225   0.0435   0.0525   0.1317   0.6466   0.0612    0.0170   0.1700  -0.0605   1.0000  
        psh |   0.2408  -0.0739  -0.0566  -0.1134  -0.3451   0.1811   0.3297    0.0367   0.0610   0.1231   0.0188   1.0000 
        mr |  -0.4209  -0.2990  -0.1338   0.1165  -0.2974  -0.1890  -0.2645 0.0562   0.0354   0.1041  -0.2276   0.1385   1.0000 
       ge |  -0.2196   0.4032   0.0944   0.0769   0.3563   0.4098   0.1178  0.0342   0.3029  -0.0173   0.5160  -0.109  -0.409   1.00 
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*Analyse des résultats du modèle à équations simultanées.  
sureg (gdp =  ge hk fdi inv pop trad gc ) (cc = gdp hk ge  ) (hk = ge gdp ir rd pse psh mr ) 
Seemingly unrelated regression 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equation       Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"       chi2        P 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
gdp             493      7            6.461901    0.0169       8.76     0.2704 
cc                493      3                1.035283    0.1648     105.16   0.0000 
hk               493      7            .2202288       0.4855     472.31   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
gdp        | 
          ge |   .6239878   .5134135     1.22   0.224    -.3822842     1.63026 
         hk |  -.7631697   1.062232    -0.72   0.472    -2.845105    1.318766 
         fdi |   .1555243   .0917782     1.69   0.090    -.0243576    .3354062 
         inv |   .0357268   .0684096     0.52   0.601    -.0983536    .1698072 
         pop |   .0840811   .1294595     0.65   0.516    -.1696548     .337817 
        trad |  -.2994704   .3837965    -0.78   0.435    -1.051698    .4527569 
          gc |   1.454449   3.243182     0.45   0.654    -4.902071    7.810969 
       _cons |   4.192684   2.352733     1.78   0.075    -.4185892    8.803956 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
cc           | 
       gdp |   .0120123   .0071706     1.68   0.094    -.0020417    .0260664 
         hk |   .3809584   .1549631     2.46   0.014     .0772363    .6846804 
         ge |   .6470029    .065189     9.93   0.000     .5192348     .774771 
       _cons |  -.6628657   .1907918    -3.47   0.001    -1.036811   -.2889207 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   hk          | 
           ge |  -.2208426   .0159047   -13.89   0.000    -.2520153   -.1896699 
         gdp |  -.0028065    .001549    -1.81   0.070    -.0058425    .0002295 
           ir |  -3.20e-10   4.23e-10    -0.76   0.450    -1.15e-09    5.09e-10 
           rd |   .2582324   .0430789     5.99   0.000     .1737994    .3426654 
          pse |  -.0125085   .0045194    -2.77   0.006    -.0213665   -.0036506 
          psh |   .5167472    .062802     8.23   0.000     .3936576    .6398368 
         mr |  -.7454766   .0396373   -18.81   0.000    -.8231643   -.6677889 
       _cons |   1.869457   .0641457    29.14   0.000     1.743733     1.99518 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
